Seminario di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
Sezione di Filosofia
Via Bolognese 52, Firenze
venerdì 27 aprile 2018, ore 11:00, aula 5
(Università di Firenze)
Beyond Grim: Punishment Norms in the Theory of Cooperation
The theory of repeated games asserts that when past conduct is unobservable, patient individuals can cooperate if defections impose large losses on cooperators, and if everyone sanctions a deviation by defecting forever (Kandori, 1992). Here we show that this extreme “grim” punishment is not necessary and, in fact, may be counterproductive if individuals are sufficiently patient. We prove that a class of moderate punishments exists, which has the advantage of supporting full cooperation
without having to arbitrarily restrict off-equilibrium payoffs. Our theory provides a rationale for the empirical observation that grim punishment is uncommon in laboratory studies of cooperation.