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Seminari del Progetto Circular Social Norms - Ci_SoNo

Organizzati dal Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia (DILEF) in collaborazione con il Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa (DISEI) dell'Università di Firenze.

Per saperne di più:

martedì, 24 novembre 2020 ore 16.00

Cristina Bicchieri (University of Pennsylvania)
Social Inferences and Norm Nudging

 

Abstract: Norm nudging relies upon informing people about what others do or approve of. However, there has been little study about what people infer from such messages. I show that the valence of the message and the frequency and dispersion of the target behavior determine the inferences that people draw.

 


giovedì,19 novembre 2020 ore 16.30

 

Johann van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Stanford, Tsinghua)

Zoom Levels at the Interface of Logic and Games 

 

Abstract: Logic and games meet in many ways. Logic can be used to analyze games, games can also be used to analyze logic, logic can help design new games, and so on. After presenting a whirlwind overview, we will discuss just one pervasive thread across the current landscape: viz. the existence of different natural "zoom levels" in looking at game structure, linked to different notions of structural invariance between games. Our first example is Backward Induction: once in terms of a fine-grained fixed-point logic of computation, and next, in terms of a coarse-grained deontic logic of "best action". Our second example is strategic action in games of imperfect information, first in terms of rich dynamic-epistemic logics of agency, and then in terms of global logics reasoning in terms of powers and dependence.We conclude by highlighting the importance of zoom levels in logic generally, as a way of seeing coherence, despite the growing diversity in logical systems.


martedì, 10 novembre 2020 ore 14

 

Bobby Duffy  (King's College, London)

Outside the echo chamber

 

Abstract: We're quick to blame fake news and the web for our post-truth age, but perhaps we just don't know the facts about the world around us. That's what Bobby Duffy, director of King's College London's Policy Institute, suggests in The Perils of Perception. Drawing on his sharp analysis of ignorance and the gaps between what we think and what's true, Duffy presents ideas which may change how you see the world.


martedì, 28 gennaio 2020, ore 14:00

DISEI - Dipartimento di Economia e Scienze dell'Impresa
via delle Pandette 32 - Firenze
Edificio D6 - Aula Bracco (I piano)

 

Cédric Paternotte  (Università di Parigi-Sorbonne)

The rise and fall of unpopular norms

 

Abstract: Unpopular norms, often discussed under the label of 'pluralistic ignorance', are intuitively puzzling: they are established in a community although no one wants to follow them. Classical examples include foot binding, binge drinking, norms of vendetta, etc. How do we explain their appearance and stability? While a number of works on this topic exist, all fail to simultaneously explain two key features of pluralistic ignorance : it arises gradually but often disappears suddenly. I argue that the main difficulty in modelling unpopular norms precisely consists in reconciling those seemingly opposite demands - because slow appearance presupposes a kind of stability that fast disappearance seems to exclude. I investigate the rise and fall of unpopular norms through a multi-agent simulation, in which agents gradually learn about their environment and have not one but two kinds of partly linked but distinct expectations : empirical expectations (about how one thinks others behave) and normative expectations (about how one thinks others want one to behave). In such a model, the gradual  appearance of an unpopular norm becomes compatible with its sudden disappearance.


mercoledì, 22 gennaio 2020, ore 11:30
DILEF - Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia
via della Pergola 60 - Firenze
Sala Altana

 

Francesco Guala (Università di Milano)

Coordination and Solution Thinking

 

Abstract: Standard theories of rational decision are unable to explain how two or more individuals can form beliefs that allow them to coordinate smoothly in situations of strategic interaction. I argue that a form of reasoning called Solution Thinking is often used effectively to solve coordination problems. The main difference between Solution Thinking and standard strategic reasoning is that beliefs are an output, not an input, of the reasoning process. I also illustrate some empirical data that seem to confirm this hypothesis.

 

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Ultimo aggiornamento

30.06.2022

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