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Home page > Eventi > Seminari > Seminari del Progetto "Circular Social Norms - Ci_SoNo"

Seminari del Progetto "Circular Social Norms - Ci_SoNo"

in collaborazione con il Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa (DISEI) dell'Università di Firenze

 

sito web del progetto 

 

martedì 28 gennaio 2020, ore 14:00
DISEI - Dipartimento di Economia e Scienze dell'Impresa
via delle Pandette 32 - Firenze
Edificio D6 - Aula Bracco (I piano)


Cédric Paternotte
(Università di Parigi-Sorbonne)


The rise and fall of unpopular norms

Abstract:
Unpopular norms, often discussed under the label of 'pluralistic ignorance', are intuitively puzzling: they are established in a community although no one wants to follow them. Classical examples include foot binding, binge drinking, norms of vendetta, etc. How do we explain their appearance and stability? While a number of works on this topic exist, all fail to simultaneously explain two key features of pluralistic ignorance : it arises gradually but often disappears suddenly. I argue that the main difficulty in modelling unpopular norms precisely consists in reconciling those seemingly opposite demands - because slow appearance presupposes a kind of stability that fast disappearance seems to exclude. I investigate the rise and fall of unpopular norms through a multi-agent simulation, in which agents gradually learn about their environment and have not one but two kinds of partly linked but distinct expectations : empirical expectations (about how one thinks others behave) and normative expectations (about how one thinks others want one to behave). In such a model, the gradual  appearance of an unpopular norm becomes compatible with its sudden disappearance.

 


 

mercoledì 22 gennaio 2020, ore 11:30
DILEF - Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia
via della Pergola 60 - Firenze
Sala Altana



Francesco Guala
(Università di Milano)

Coordination and Solution Thinking

Abstract:
Standard theories of rational decision are unable to explain how two or more individuals can form beliefs that allow them to coordinate smoothly in situations of strategic interaction. I argue that a form of reasoning called Solution Thinking is often used effectively to solve coordination problems. The main difference between Solution Thinking and standard strategic reasoning is that beliefs are an output, not an input, of the reasoning process. I also illustrate some empirical data that seem to confirm this hypothesis.

 


 

giovedì 21 novembre 2019, ore 14:00
DISEI - Dipartimento di Economia e Scienze dell'Impresa
via delle Pandette 32 - Firenze
Aula Bracco (I piano)


Pierpaolo Battigalli
(Università Bocconi, Milano)

Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment

Abstract:
In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of promises or threats at odds with personal gain maximization. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of the Ultimatum Minigame, assuming that the choice of accepting or rejecting an unfair proposal is affected by a combination of frustration, due to unfulfilled expectations, and inequity aversion. We increase the responder's payoff from the default allocation (the proposer's outside option) with the purpose of increasing the responder's frustration due to the unfair proposal, and thus his willingness to reject it. In addition, we manipulate the method of play, with the purpose of switching on (direct response method) and off (strategy method) the responder's experience of anger. Our behavioral predictions across and within treatments are derived from the theoretical model complemented by explicit auxiliary assumptions, without relying on equilibrium analysis.

 


 

martedì 15 ottobre 2019, ore 16:30
DILEF - Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia
via della Pergola 60 - Firenze
Sala Altana


Alexandru Baltag
(ILLC, Amsterdam)


SURPRISE! Or How to Avoid Unexpected Exams

Abstract:
The Hangman puzzle, in its "Unexpected Examination" version, is a well-known paradox in epistemic logic literature, that involves circularity and self-reference. It involves a Teacher announcing her students that the exam's date (known only to be sometimes next week) will be a "surprise": even in the evening before the exam, the students will still not be sure that the exam is tomorrow. Intuitively, one can prove (by backward induction, starting with Friday) that, if this announcement is true, then the exam cannot take place in any day of the week. So, using this argument, the students come to "know" that the announcement is false: the exam cannot be a surprise. Given this reasoning, they just dismiss the announcement as false, and... then, whenever the exam will come (say, on Tuesday) it will indeed be a complete surprise!
I discuss the various solutions in the literature, including some new solutions. Time-permitting, I sketch some new directions of approaching this puzzle: one based on a theory of doxastic attitudes, epistemic norms and dynamic belief revision; another based on the topological concepts of Cantor-Bendixson derivative and the perfect core of a set; and a third based on a game-theoretic analysis.  The conclusion of my discussion will come as a... surprise! (Or so I hope!)

 

 

 
ultimo aggiornamento: 21-Gen-2020
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