Seminari del Progetto Circular Social Norms - Ci_SoNo 2019

giovedì 21 novembre 2019, ore 14:00
DISEI - Dipartimento di Economia e Scienze dell'Impresa
via delle Pandette 32 - Firenze
Aula Bracco (I piano)

Pierpaolo Battigalli (Università Bocconi, Milano)

Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment


Abstract: In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of promises or threats at odds with personal gain maximization. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of the Ultimatum Minigame, assuming that the choice of accepting or rejecting an unfair proposal is affected by a combination of frustration, due to unfulfilled expectations, and inequity aversion. We increase the responder's payoff from the default allocation (the proposer's outside option) with the purpose of increasing the responder's frustration due to the unfair proposal, and thus his willingness to reject it. In addition, we manipulate the method of play, with the purpose of switching on (direct response method) and off (strategy method) the responder's experience of anger. Our behavioral predictions across and within treatments are derived from the theoretical model complemented by explicit auxiliary assumptions, without relying on equilibrium analysis.

martedì 15 ottobre 2019, ore 16:30

DILEF - Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia
via della Pergola 60 - Firenze
Sala Altana

Alexandru Baltag (ILLC, Amsterdam)

SURPRISE! Or How to Avoid Unexpected Exams


Abstract: The Hangman puzzle, in its "Unexpected Examination" version, is a well-known paradox in epistemic logic literature, that involves circularity and self-reference. It involves a Teacher announcing her students that the exam's date (known only to be sometimes next week) will be a "surprise": even in the evening before the exam, the students will still not be sure that the exam is tomorrow. Intuitively, one can prove (by backward induction, starting with Friday) that, if this announcement is true, then the exam cannot take place in any day of the week. So, using this argument, the students come to "know" that the announcement is false: the exam cannot be a surprise. Given this reasoning, they just dismiss the announcement as false, and... then, whenever the exam will come (say, on Tuesday) it will indeed be a complete surprise!
I discuss the various solutions in the literature, including some new solutions. Time-permitting, I sketch some new directions of approaching this puzzle: one based on a theory of doxastic attitudes, epistemic norms and dynamic belief revision; another based on the topological concepts of Cantor-Bendixson derivative and the perfect core of a set; and a third based on a game-theoretic analysis.  The conclusion of my discussion will come as a... surprise! (Or so I hope!)

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