Martedì, 16 novembre 2021 ore 11.30
Sala del Consiglio, Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia
Orly Shenker (The Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Visiting Professor presso il DILEF
Is the Mind in the Brain in Contemporary Neuroscience?
Abstract: According to a popular view, the mental (or at least part of it) is explained as being computations implemented in the brain. This view faces two problems: the problem of multiple-computations and the problem of multiple-realization, each of them making the computational theory of mind incoherent. The prevalent solutions for these problems don’t work: trying to solve the multiple realization problem by functionalism only repeats the problem, and that trying to solve the multiple computations problem by environmental interactions repates the problem in a way that leads to infinite regress. The solutions for both have to be by choosing between reductive physicalism and mind-body dualism.
ATTENZIONE: gli studenti che intendono partecipare devono obbligatoriamente registrarsi per l'evento scrivendo a francesca.pero[AT]unifi.it entro e non oltre domenica 14 novembre, in modo da consentire l'abilitazione del loro QR Code per l'accesso al Dipartimento in tempo per l'evento.
Mercoledì, 12 maggio 2021 ore 15
Shawn Standefer (Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava)
Varieties of necessity in a non-classical setting
Abstract: In standard modal logics, there are three common conceptions of necessity:, the universal conception, the equivalence relation conception, and the axiomatic conception. theses provide distinct presentations of the modal logic S5, commonly used in metaphysics and epistemology. In standard settings, these presentations coincide, giving three views of a single, unified logic. I will explore these different conceptions in the context of the relevant logic R, explaining when they come apart and why that matters. This reveals that there are many options for being an S5-ish extension of R. It further reveals a divide between the universal conception of necessity on the one hand, and the axiomatic conception on the other: The latter is consistent with motivations for relevant logics while the former is not. For the committed relevant logician, necessity cannot be truth in all possible worlds.
Mercoledì, 5 maggio 2021 ore 15
Catrin Campbell-Moore (University of Bristol)
Beliefs and a general account for self-referential notions
Abstract: sometimes one’s adopted beliefs can provide additional evidence that undermines their own rational adoption. Such cases bear a close relationship to the liar paradox. We propose moving to allowing one's beliefs to be indefinite, and requiring that any definite recommendations are definite. Our account is very general and could apply to a whole range of circular, or self-dependent notions. It bears some similarity to the supervaluational Kripkean fixed-point account of truth and can immediately apply to a whole range of notions by just requiring the specification of a revision notion on the precisifications.
Mercoledì, 21 aprile 2021 ore 15
Laura Crosilla (University of Oslo)
Indefinite Extensibility and Logic
Abstract: It is often thought that intuitionistic logic and predicativity are wholly independent aspects of a foundational theory. In fact, the mathematical literature presents us with classical predicative theories (e.g. Feferman’s system W) as well as intuitionistic impredicative theories (as Friedman’s IZF). In this talk, I analyse an argument inspired by Michael Dummett’s argument from indefinite extensibility. The argument takes predicativity is its starting point and reaches the conclusion that we should employ intuitionistic logic in mathematics. My aim is to analyse rather than defend this argument. The principal consequence of the argument is that it highlights a complex interconnection between predicativity and intuitionistic logic. I consider whether the argument may also shed some light on the relation between classical and intuitionistic forms of predicativity.
Mercoledì, 17 marzo 2021 ore 15
Johannes Stern (University of Bristol)
Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knowledge: No Luck?
Abstract: The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth in the framework of subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene or FDE. This blocks the usual road to fixed-point results for Kripke's theory of truth relative to the semantics. However, using the theory of quasi-inductive definitions we show that the so-called Kripke jump will have fixed points despite the non-monotonicity of the semantics: Kripke's theory of truth can be successfully applied in the framework of subjunctive theories of knowledge.