Seminario di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
Seminario di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza
Sezione di Filosofia
Via Bolognese 52, aula 5
(salvo diversa comunicazione)
venerdì 25 maggio, ore 11:00, aula 5
(University of South Carolina)
Principle of least action and path integrals: a philosophical review.
The following presentation is meant to provide a general overview of the philosophical debate about the principle of least action (PLA). Firstly, i will introduce the Lagrangian formalism and its relation to PLA. Secondly, i will analyse some of the most popular philosophical interpretations of such principle (i.e. dispositions, teleology and modality). Ultimately, I present PLA as emergent from the Feynman path integrals where the latter are to be taken as an holistic ensemble of possible paths.
venerdì 18 maggio 2018, ore 11:00, aula 5
Pierandrea Lo Nostro
(Università di Firenze)
Il significato delle recenti scoperte degli elementi transuranici
giovedì 10 maggio 2018, ore 13:00, aula 6
(University of Edinburgh)
The Open Past, Classical Style
Many philosophers are familiar with the doctrine of the "open future" - the doctrine, roughly speaking, that claims about undetermined aspects of the future currently fail to be true. For instance: it is not now true that it will rain tomorrow, but it is also not now true that it will /not / rain tomorrow. The future is, in this sense, "open". The open future doctrine has always provoke dcontroversy on both metaphysical and logical grounds; in particular, must the open futurist deny the classical principle of bivalence? In this talk, I aim to make progress on these difficult questions by investigating what we might say about a different sort of openness, a sort of openness that almost no one accepts - the openness of the past. I defend a picture of the open past - and the open future - that preserves classical logic.
venerdì 27 aprile 2018, ore 11:00, aula 5
(Università di Firenze)
Beyond Grim: Punishment Norms in the Theory of Cooperation
The theory of repeated games asserts that when past conduct is unobservable, patient individuals can cooperate if defections impose large losses on cooperators, and if everyone sanctions a deviation by defecting forever (Kandori, 1992). Here we show that this extreme “grim” punishment is not necessary and, in fact, may be counterproductive if individuals are sufficiently patient. We prove that a class of moderate punishments exists, which has the advantage of supporting full cooperation
without having to arbitrarily restrict off-equilibrium payoffs. Our theory provides a rationale for the empirical observation that grim punishment is uncommon in laboratory studies of cooperation.
venerdì 20 aprile 2018, ore 11:00, aula 6
(Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, IHPST - Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques)
Causalità in un mondo fisico?
La maggior parte dei filosofi della fisica sono eliminativisti per quanto riguarda la causalità. Seguendo Bertrand Russell, pensano che la causalità sia un concetto ingenuo (“folk”), che non possa essere ricostruito in modo razionale all’interno di una concezione del mondo informata dalla fisica contemporanea. Contro questa tesi, sostengo che la fisica può contribuire a dare forma al concetto di causalità, in due maniere.
1. La relatività ristretta è una teoria fisica che esprime vincoli causali;
2. Il concetto fisico di quantità conservata può essere usata nella riduzione funzionale della nozione ingenua della causalità.
Per dimostrare che la fisica fornisce strumenti per elaborare il concetto di causalità è necessario evitare certi fraintendimenti.
1) La causalità non è il determinismo. Inserire la causalità in una concezione del mondo vincolata dalla fisica differisce sia dal 2) “iperrealismo” (Field) sia dal 3) “fondamentalismo causale” (Norton).
La tesi che la causalità fa parte del mondo fisico non implica che la causalità sia un ingrediente in più dell' “arredamento” del mondo, in aggiunta agli ingredienti identificati dalla fisica.
venerdì 23 marzo 2018, ore 11:00
LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München
BHI - Black Hole Initiative, Harvard University
Theory Semantics: Epistemology, Yes; Ontology, No
Essentially all popular contemporary accounts of the semantics of scientific theories bases meaning on something like truth conditions in something like a Tarskian sense: I know the meaning of a scientific theory when I know how to interpret its terms using designation relations such that its propositions come out true. What was wanted was an account of "meaning" analytically connected to truth, completely divorced from human concerns. But this is self-defeating, for such a conception completely divorces semantics from the fundamental sources of scientific knowledge ---experimental knowledge--- which in the end must ground the empirical content and significance of our theoretical representations. An adequate account of semantics, I argue, will return to the Carnapian conception that semantics must ground analysis of
epistemology, and be grounded in turn by our grasp of it. Thus, an account of semantics must make explicit links to scientific knowledge in all its human forms: as achieved state, both in theory and in experiment; as mediator of evidentiary relations and provider of epistemic warrant; and as ground for the successful continuation of the
scientific enterprise, the extension and deepening of the first kind by application of the second.
Workshop On Predication
venerdì 23 febbraio 2018, ore 9:45
10:00 Øystein Linnebo (University of Oslo)
Ontological categories and the problem of expressibility
(joint work with Bob Hale)
Frege famously held that the ontological categories correspond to the logico-syntactic types. Something is an object just in case it can be referred to by a singular term, and likewise for all the other categories. This view faces an expressibility problem. In order to express the view, we need to generalize across categories; but by the view itself, any one variable can only range over a single category. We provide a sharp formulation of the problem, show that there is no easy way out, and then explore some of the hard ways.
11:30 Sergio Bernini (Università di Firenze)
The logic of Fregean concepts
The relations between Frege’s notions of concept and of object are analyzed from a logical point of view. Such relations turn out to go beyond that of falling under, so the standard theory must be widened. The result is a theory of a general kind of relations that we call copular relations. Arguments are given to show that this notion of copularity is logically founded and not merely conventional.
14:00 Fraser Macbride (University of Manchester)
Relations: predicates expressing them and names denoting them
I argue that predicates in general and many place predicates in particular are impurely referring expressions, i.e. do not only refer to relations but perform a further co-ordinating function in virtue of which a sentence is more than a list. Conceiving of predicates as impurely referring expressions not only provides a solution to Frege's Paradox of the Concept Horse but also allows us to address the Puzzle about Relation Names advanced by van Inwagen. Because it enables us to solve these puzzles, this gives us reason to favour my view that predicates are impurely referring expressions.